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748 (1976). However, the Court stated
that the proper analysis is guided by the
four-prong test found in Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).54 U.S.L.W.
at 4960.
Applying the first prong of the Central
Hudson test, the Court held that "[t]he particular kind of commercial speech at issue
here ... concerns a lawful activity and is
not misleading or fraudulent." Id. Moving
on to the next prong, the Court found that
regulatory scheme passed muster as "the
Puerto Rico Legislature's interest in the
health, safety, and welfare of its citizens
constitutes a 'substantial' governmental interest." Id. The third prong was also found
to be met as the restrictions on commercial
speech "directly advance" the government's
asserted substantial interest by attempting
to reduce the demand for casino gambling.
Finally, the Court found that the restrictions on commercial speech, as narrowly
construed by the lower court, are no more
extensive than necessary to serve the government's interest since they "will not affect advertising of casino gambling aimed
at tourists, but will apply only to such advertising when aimed at the residents of
Puerto Rico." Id. at 4961. Thus, the Court
concluded that the regulations, as construed by the lower court, were facially
constitutional under the Central Hudson
test.
The Court then addressed the appellant's
second argument that the advertising restrictions were constitutionally defective
under the holdings in Carey v. Population
Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), (striking down a ban on any "advertisement or
display" of contraceptives); and Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), (reversing
criminal conviction based on advertisement
of an abortion clinic). However, the Court
found those cases where "the underlying
conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited
by the State" distinguishable from casino
gambling which the Puerto Rico Legislature could have prohibited altogether. 54
U.S.L.W. at 4961. Thus, the Court arrived at the conclusion that "the greater
power to completely ban casino gambling
necessarily includes the lesser power to
ban advertising of casino gambling." Id.
The Court restated this new first amendment analysis more generally as "it is precisely because the government could have
enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it is permissible for
the government to take the less intrusive
step of allowing the conduct, but reducing
the demand through restriction of advertising." Id. (emphasis in original). Con16- The Law Forurn/Fa/~ 1986

tinuing on, the Court observed that "[l]egislative regulation of products or activities
deemed harmful, such as cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and prostitution has varied
from out right prohibition on the one hand
... to legalization of the product or activity
with restrictions on stimulation of its demand on the other hand." Id. "To rule out
the latter intermediate kind of response
would require more than we find in the
First Amendment," the Court concluded.
Thus, the restrictions on advertising were
upheld as constitutional.
Justice Brennan dissented, stating that
"I see no reason why commercial speech
should be afforded less protection than
other types of speech where, as here, the
government seeks to suppress commercial
speech in order to deprive consumers of
accurate information concerning lawful
activity." Id. at 4962. Justice Brennan also
disagreed with the majority's deferral "to
what it perceives to be the determination
by Puerto Rico's legislature that a ban on
casino advertising aimed at residents is
reasonable." Id. at 4963.
Justice Stevens also dissented, finding
that "Puerto Rico blatantly discriminates
in its punishment of speech depending on
the publication, audience, and words employed." Id. at 4965.
The first part of the Court's holding simply represents an extended application of
the Central Hudson, first amendment analysis for commercial speech. However, it
is the Court's introduction of "the greater
power necessarily includes the lesser power"
language into first amendment constitutional analysis which gives this case special
significance. Expansion of this new analysis, even beyond that alluded to by the
Court in its opinion, could eventually permit further erosion of the various analysis
under the freedom of speech. For example,
a content-based restriction could possibly
be disguised by the "greater includes the
lesser" analysis. It remains to be seen
whether this is the direction the new Court,
possibly under Justice Rehnquist, will take.
-Eric P. Macdonell

Frye v. Frye: MARYLAND
REAFFIRMS THE PARENT-CHILD
IMMUNITY RULE
In Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542 (1986), the
Court of Appeals of Maryland declined to
overturn the parent-child immunity rule
which has existed in Maryland for fifty-six
years. The court also declined to create an
exception to the rule for cases involving

the negligent operation of a motor vehicle.
In Frye, the plaintiffs, George L. Frye III,
a minor, and his mother, Barbara Frye, received injuries when the automobile in
which they were passengers went off the
road and collided with a culvert. At the
time of the occurrence, the automobile
was being operated by George L. Frye, Jr.,
who was the father and husband of the
passengers.
Suit was brought in the Circuit Court
for Prince Georges County by Barbar~
Frye, individually and as guardian and
next friend of George L. Frye, III, against
George L. Frye, Jr. for damages incurred
as a result of the defendant's negligence.
The court granted a motion to dismiss the
action as to Barbara Frye, individually, on
the ground that the doctrine ofinterspousal
immunity had been in effect upon the accrual of her cause of action and thus, relief
could not be granted. The court also dismissed the action brought on behalf of
George L. Frye, III on the ground that no
relief could be granted under the parentchild immunity rule.
Barbara Frye appealed to the court of
special appeals. In the meantime, the court
of appeals granted Mrs. Frye's request for
the court to certify the records and proceedings before a decision was rendered by
the court of special appeals.
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that
the parent-child immunity rule should be
abrogated as to torts sounding in negligence in light of the court's recent abrogation of inters pousa1immunity. See Boblitz
v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506
(1983). In the alternative, the plaintiffcontended that an exception should be carved
from the parent-child immunity rule for
motor vehicle torts. The court refused to
create the exception.
Parent-child immunity, a creation of the
American judicial system, was adopted
by the court of appeals in Schneider v.
Schneider, 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
As construed in Maryland, the rule bars
suits by a child against his or her parent
and by a parent against his or her child for
personal injury arising from a tort. The
court of appeals has recognized two exceptions to the rule. First, the court has held
that a minor child has a right to maintain a
cause of action against his or her parent for
"cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs." Mahnke v.
Moore, 197 Md. 61, 68, 77 A.2d 923, 926
(1951). Secondly, the court has declined to
extend the parent-child immunity rule to
encompass a suit between an emancipated
child and a parent. Waltzinger v. Birsner,
212 Md. 107,.128 A.2d 617 (1957).
Frye is the first case, since the adoption
of parent-child immunity in Maryland, in

which the court of appeals has examined
the viability of the rule as it applies to suits
sounding in negligence between an unemancipated child and a parent. In its examination of the rule, the court advanced
several reasons for its refusal to reverse the
parent-child immunity rule in light of the
reversal of the interspousal immunity rule.
The court stated that the reasons for which
interspousal immunity was abrogated are
inapplicable with respect to parent-child
immunity. The doctrine of interspousal
immunity arose from the legal fiction that
a husband and a wife were one person at
common law. Thus, husbands and wives
were incapable of suing each other since,
in effect, they would be suing themselves.
However, no such unity has existed between parent and child. Additionally, the
court held that the abrogation of interspousal immunity was premised on changes
which have occurred in the relationship of
husband and wife since the adoption of
the immunity. The court then examined
whether the nature of the parent-child relationship has changed so as to compel a
re-examination of parent-child immunity.
Parent-child immunity is premised on
the responsibility of the parent for the
training and education of the child. As a
result, the parent has been given the right
to exercise control and discipline over the
child as is necessary to fulfill his or her
parental duties. The immunity enhances
the parent's authority to use his or her discretion to discipline and care for the child.
Additionally, the court of appeals has declared it to be the public policy of Maryland to preserve the peace and harmony of
the home and to preserve discipline within
the family.
The court held that the parent-child immunity rule continues to further this policy. The court found that the parent-child
relationship has not changed so drastically
as to require abrogation ofparent-childimmunity. Thus, the rule remains viable
today.
The court refused to decide whether, in
light of Maryland's compulsory insurance
laws, an exception to the parent-child immunity rule should be created for injuries
resulting from the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle. Instead, the court stated
that compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance is a creation of the legislature. The
court recognized that such an exception
would have a significant impact on the insurance scheme and the public policy behind it. Thus, the court held that the creation of such an exception is within the
province of the legislature.
The parent-child immunity rule evolved
in the United States as a means of ensuring
the existence of family harmony and pa-

rental authority and discretion in the discipline and care of children. Since its adoption, the rule has been criticized as not
fulfilling its functions. Evidence of disillusionment with the parent-child immunity
rule is indicated by the trend in the United
States toward abrogation of the rule. The
majority of states have vacated the parentchild immunity rule, either totally or partially. Most of the states which retain the
rule in part have carved out an exception
for suits based on the negligent operation
of an automobile. Cognizant of this trend,
the Maryland court of appeals refused to
change the parent-child immunity rule.
In light of the Frye decision, it appears
that the parent-child immunity rule will
remain embodied in the law of Maryland
for some time to come. The court of appeals has reaffirmed the position of the
Maryland judiciary that a child is completely barred from maintaining a tort action against his or her parent based upon
negligence.

- Sharon Gamble
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